

# **Firms' Perceived Cost of Capital**

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# Introduction

## Standard teaching and theory

- Invest if project return  $>$  cost of capital (CoC)
- Starting point: firm-level CoC
- To max. market value: firm CoC =  $r^{\text{exp}}$  = avg. exp. return to debt & equity
- Problem:  $r^{\text{exp}}$  hard to estimate (Fama and French 1997), firms set  $r^{\text{perc}}$

## Importance of $r^{\text{perc}}$

- $r^{\text{perc}} = r^{\text{exp}}$ : bedrock assumption in standard models
- $r^{\text{perc}}$  shapes long-run investment in the data
- Surveys qualitative: 70% use multi-factors, 40% past returns (Graham 2022)

## Today

- Measurement of  $r^{\text{perc}}$
- Time variation:  $r^{\text{perc}}$  and  $r^{\text{exp}}$  co-move
- Cross section: 20% of variation in  $r^{\text{perc}}$  justified by  $r^{\text{exp}}$ , 50% by  $r^{\text{CAPM}}$
- $r^{\text{perc}} \neq r^{\text{exp}}$  lowers TFP by 5% in standard model

## Data from Corporate Conference Calls

Nestlé, Q4-2006: *"We use an average cost of capital of 7.5%."*

Air Canada, Q3-2017: *"... our weighted average cost of capital of 7.6%."*

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## Data collection

- Manually read transcripts with RA team
- 110k paragraphs containing keywords, 2002-22 (sample growing)
- Analyze only firm-level CoC; separately collect project-specific numbers

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## Data overview

- 3,200 observation of perc. CoC for 1,200 firms in 20 countries
- Representative, except larger firms
- Firms with perc. CoC account for 40% of Compustat assets in advanced economies
- Predicted data under [costofcapital.org](https://costofcapital.org)

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
## Verifiable data

- Calls are repeated high-stakes interactions ([Hassan et al. 2019](#))
- Information from conference calls used in security lawsuits
- Data validation in paper and next

## Why Does $r^{\text{perc}}$ Matter?

Investment depends on internal req. return = hurdle/discount rate =  $r^{\text{perc}} + \kappa$

Changes in  $r^{\text{perc}}$  do not affect discount rates in short run, but incorporated in long run



Analysis requires within-firm data, previous surveys inconclusive

(e.g., [Poterba and Summers 1995](#); [Meier and Tarhan 2007](#); [Sharpe and Suarez 2021](#); [Graham 2022](#))

# Discount Rate Dynamics Raise New Questions

## 1. Secular distortions?

Discount rate wedges fluctuate and account for US “missing investment” puzzle  
([Gormsen and Huber 2025](#))

## 2. Macro policy?

Conventional monetary policy weak, but demand shocks and exp. inflation powerful ([Fukui et al. 2025](#))

## 3. Micro foundations?

Organizational, behavioral, or financing frictions ([Barry et al. 2024](#); [Best et al. 2024](#); [Caramp et al. 2024](#); [Jeenas 2024](#); [Wroblewski 2024](#); [Fukui et al. 2025](#))

## 4. Long run capital allocation?



Depends on perc. CoC, so want to understand its drivers  
([this paper](#))



## Perceived Cost of Capital and Real Outcomes

Perceived CoC influences real decisions, so it generates:



- lower investment
- higher average realized returns







Magnitudes consistent with standard model and robust to controls

# Time Variation in $r^{\text{perc}}$ Follows Classic Expected Return Measures

$$r^{\text{perc}} = a_0 + 0.59^{***} \times \text{Earnings yield}_t + 0.32^{***} \times \text{Treasury yield}_t + \varepsilon$$




# Classic Factors Shape Cross-Sectional Variation in $r^{\text{perc}}$



Consistent with [Modigliani and Miller \(1958\)](#) and [Fama and French \(1993\)](#)

# A New Factor: Greenness Since 2016

“Climate Capitalists” (with Simon Oh) studies CoC of green and brown firms



- Identify green and brown firms using MSCI data
- Green firms perceive significantly lower CoC since 2016

## Does $r^{\text{perc}} = r^{\text{exp}}$ ?

Move beyond individual predictors; test  $r^{\text{perc}} = r^{\text{exp}}$

Ideally, estimate:

$$r^{\text{exp}} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 r^{\text{perc}} + \varepsilon$$

1. If  $r^{\text{perc}} = r^{\text{exp}}$  then  $\beta = 1$  &  $R^2 = 1$
2. If  $r^{\text{perc}}$  is an unbiased estimate of  $r^{\text{exp}}$  then  $\beta = 1$

Problem:  $r^{\text{exp}}$  unobserved


- Adapt “AP trick” and use realized returns:  $r^{\text{realized}} = r^{\text{exp}} + \zeta$
- Estimate:

$$r^{\text{realized}} = B_0 + B_1 r^{\text{perc}} + \xi.$$

- $B_1 = \beta_1$  by definition

## $r^{\text{perc}}$ Is Biased


If  $r^{\text{perc}}$  is an unbiased estimate of  $r^{\text{exp}}$  then  $\beta = 1$



$$r^{\text{perc}} \neq r^{\text{exp}}$$

## Bias Relative to CAPM

Do firms target CAPM, not  $r^{\text{exp}}$  (implies firms do not max. market value)?




$r^{\text{perc}}$  less biased relative to CAPM, but still by 50%

⇒ Non-standard terms added by managers matter

## Excess Dispersion in $r^{\text{perc}}$

$1 - \beta_1 = \% \text{ of variation in } r^{\text{perc}} \text{ not justified by variation in } r^{\text{exp}}$

$1 - \beta_1 = \text{“excess dispersion”}$






# Excess Dispersion Relative to Implied Cost of Capital


Alternative measure of  $r^{\text{exp}}$ : “implied cost of capital”

Requires  $r^{\text{implied}} = r^{\text{exp}} + \eta$ , with  $\eta$  and  $r^{\text{perc}}$  uncorrelated




# Heterogeneity in Excess Dispersion

Excess dispersion similar across firm types



## Excess Dispersion Driven by Cost of Equity

Analyze perceived costs of equity and debt separately





Excess dispersion not due to mismeasurement of tax, leverage, or  $r^{\text{debt}}$

ME unlikely to drive results (predicts ROIC, factor-based IV)

## Excess Dispersion in Summary Statistics

Raw histograms suggest that  $r^{\text{perc}}$  is too dispersed to be driven by  $r^{\text{exp}}$  alone



10-90 spread in the perc. cost of equity is 8%

Few stocks have 8% difference in long-run expected returns

# Excess Dispersion and Misallocation

Want to gauge: How much can excess dispersion matter for real economy?

- $r^{\text{perc}} \propto$  capital in data

Standard models:  $r^{\text{perc}} \neq r^{\text{exp}} \Rightarrow$  capital misallocation  $\Rightarrow$  TFP loss (David et al. 2022)

Benchmark of Hsieh and Klenow (2009): TFP loss  $\propto$  excess dispersion in data

- assume log-normality of TFP and  $r^{\text{perc}}$ , independence of wedge and  $r^{\text{perc}}$

Impact of excess dispersion on TFP	
Using realized returns (baseline)	-5.36%
Using implied cost of capital	-5.02%
Low elasticity of cross-product substitution ( $\sigma = 3$ )	-4.02%
High elasticity of cross-product substitution ( $\sigma = 5$ )	-6.70%

Implication:

- (1) either  $r^{\text{perc}} \neq r^{\text{exp}}$  causes large welfare losses
- (2)  $r^{\text{perc}} \neq r^{\text{exp}}$  efficient, standard models incomplete, firms do not max. market value

# Potential Drivers of Excess Dispersion

## 1. Estimation errors

- $r^{\text{exp}}$  hard to estimate (Fama and French 1997), CAPM too simplistic
- Managers over-correct using biased perceptions (Greenwood and Shleifer 2014)

## 2. Alternative objective function

- Max. future value? Unlikely, bias also w.r.t. future returns
- Equity mispriced, so max. “fair value”? (Stein 1996) Maybe, yet CAPM bias = 50%

## 3. Bayesian learning

- Can generate bias if agents react strongly to past (Martin and Nagel 2022)
- But bias is high and rational Bayesians often shrink

## 4. Unlikely: fake signaling of low $r^{\text{perc}}$

- Avg.  $r^{\text{perc}} > r^{\text{exp}}$
- Costly, as  $r^{\text{perc}}$  distorts investment
- Distressed, undervalued, or low ROE firms do not have more excess dispersion

# Conclusions

Across the board:  $r^{\text{perc}} \neq r^{\text{exp}}$

## Implications for research

- Bedrock assumption  $r^{\text{perc}} = r^{\text{exp}}$  questionable
- Generates TFP loss in standard models
- Future work: can  $r^{\text{perc}} \neq r^{\text{exp}}$  be rationalized?

## Implications for practice

- What do managers learn in MBA class?
- Should we teach CoC differently?
- Should govt. policy target the TFP loss?

More on [costofcapital.org](http://costofcapital.org)

**Thank You!**

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