Corporate Discount Rates*

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Abstract

Standard theory implies that the discount rates used by firms in investment decisions play a key role in determining investment and transmit shocks to asset prices and interest rates to the real economy. However, there exists little evidence on how corporate discount rates change over time and affect investment. We construct a new global database of firms’ discount rates based on manual entry from earnings conference calls. We show that corporate discount rates move with the cost of capital, but the relation is less than one-to-one, leading to time-varying wedges between discount rates and the cost of capital. The average discount rate wedge has increased substantially over the last decades as the cost of capital has dropped. Discount rate wedges are negatively related to future investment, with a magnitude close to that predicted by theory. Moreover, the large and growing discount rate wedges can account for low investment (relative to high asset prices) in recent decades. We find that risk and the combination of market power and managerial beliefs about value creation explain levels and trends of discount rate wedges.

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Asset prices and interest rates are highly volatile, exhibiting both short-run fluctuations as well as persistent trends. Over the last decades, for instance, asset prices have increased dramatically and interest rates have declined secularly. These trends reflect that investors have substantially lowered their required returns to holding stocks and bonds and, similarly, that banks have lowered their required returns to lending.

According to a stylized view, often maintained in standard models and policy debates, changes in the returns required by investors should lead to equivalent changes in the returns required by firms on their new investment projects. The argument is that the required returns of investors represent the cost of new funding to firms, the so-called “financial cost of capital,” and that firms should take on any investment project that offers returns above this cost. The stylized view thus implies that firms’ required returns on investment should have dropped substantially over the last decades, leading to a boom in corporate investment. More generally, the view implies that any shock to the financial cost of capital, such as monetary policy and credit provision, directly influence firms’ required returns and thus investment.

It is unclear, however, whether firms use their financial cost of capital as their required return. Unlike the cost of labor, firms pay their financial cost of capital very infrequently. Firms rarely issue equity—the major component of their capital—and therefore cannot deduce their financial cost of capital from actual transactions. Instead, firms need to estimate their financial cost of capital. Such estimation is notoriously difficult, implying that firms’ internal estimate, which we term the “perceived cost of capital,” may deviate substantially from the true financial cost of capital. Moreover, firms’ required returns, their so-called “discount rates,” may reflect a host of other factors, not just the perceived cost of capital. Discount rates may thus differ substantially from the financial cost of capital and it is possible that the two hardly comove. Such a decoupling of firms’ discount rates from the financial cost of capital would have broad implications for theory and severely limit the real effects of shocks to financial markets.

Despite the importance of discount rate dynamics, our understanding is limited because firms’ perceived cost of capital and discount rates are not easily observed. Existing surveys suggest that many firms use discount rates greater than the financial cost of capital (Poterba and Summers 1995, Jagannathan et al. 2016, Graham 2022). However, there exists little data tracing individual firms’ perceived cost of capital and discount rates over time and linking them to real outcomes. As a result, we do not know whether individual firms dynamically adjust their perceived cost of capital with asset prices and interest rates, whether discount rates change with the perceived cost of capital and other factors, and whether discount rates
can account for investment dynamics.

In this paper, we construct a new dataset to study the dynamics of corporate discount rates and their relation to investment. The dataset measures discount rates and the perceived cost of capital for 2,400 firms, including many of the world’s largest corporations. We show that firms adjust their perceived cost of capital when the financial cost of capital fluctuates, although the effect is not always one-to-one. Moreover, firms only partially incorporate changes in their perceived cost of capital into discount rates. The partial incorporation generates large and time-varying “discount rate wedges” between discount rates and the perceived cost of capital. These wedges are strongly associated with firm investment and have, on average, increased substantially since 2002. The increase in the average wedge is large enough to account for low aggregate US investment since 2002. We show that the combination of market power and managerial beliefs about value creation as well as uncertainty have contributed to higher discount rate wedges among US firms.

We measure firms’ discount rates and perceived cost of capital using corporate conference calls. The majority of listed firms hold conference calls every quarter, so that managers can inform financial analysts and investors about their firms’ operations. On these calls, managers sometimes reveal their discount rates and perceived cost of capital as a way of providing transparency to investment decisions. An advantage of conference calls is that they are held regularly and that analysts can compare previously reported discount rates to realized outcomes. These aspects incentivize managers to report meaningful numbers. We collect transcripts for conference calls between 2002 and 2021 and identify 74,000 paragraphs where managers discuss their discount rates or cost of capital. We read through each paragraph with a team of research assistants and manually extract relevant information. The product of this data collection effort is a large, global database of firms’ discount rates and perceived cost of capital, matched to investment rates. The data contain roughly 2,400 firms across 20 countries. A unique feature of the data is that we collect repeated observations for the same firms and countries. We observe discount rates and the perceived cost of capital for 19 sequential years in multiple countries, giving rise to a country-level panel; and we observe many firms multiple times, giving rise to a firm-level panel. This

1 The perceived cost of capital is the firm’s internal estimate of the weighted average of the after-tax cost of debt and cost of equity. The discount rate is the rate at which the firm values future cash flows and which enters its net present value (NPV) calculation, also usually expressed after accounting for taxes. Managers often discuss discount rates in terms of minimum required returns or hurdle rates on new investments. For the marginal project, the minimum required return is equal to the discount rate. We therefore use the terms discount rate, hurdle rate, and required internal rate of return interchangeably in our data collection.
panel variation is new to the literature and key to understanding how discount rates and the perceived cost of capital relate to one another and to investment.

We start the analysis by relating firms’ perceived cost of capital to the cost of capital in financial markets. The cost of capital is the weighted average after-tax cost of debt and equity. Firms can approximate the financial cost of debt using bond yields and interest rates. It is thus not surprising that the financial cost of debt in a given country is closely associated with the cost of debt perceived by firms. However, to calculate the cost of equity, firms need to estimate expected stock returns, which is notably difficult (Fama and French 1997, Pástor and Stambaugh 1999, Jagannathan et al. 2017). MBA students are often taught simplified approaches, for example to assume a constant equity risk premium, which would lead to mistakes in the perceived cost of equity (Cochrane 2011). Nonetheless, we find that firms’ perceived cost of capital incorporates variation in the cost of equity. We measure the country-level cost of equity using the earnings yield on the market and incorporate firm-level variation using the Capital Asset Pricing Model. On average, the perceived cost of capital increases by 0.8 percentage points when the financial cost of capital increases by 1 percentage point. Given the uncertainty inherent in estimating the financial cost of capital, we cannot reject that the estimate is close to 1 on average. We do, however, find substantial heterogeneity in the perceived cost of capital across firms that cannot easily be justified by variation in the financial cost of capital.

We next study how discount rates relate to the perceived cost of capital. We confirm the existing finding that discount rates are substantially higher than the cost of capital, on average twice as large. More importantly, using within-firm variation, we find that changes in the perceived cost of capital are incorporated into discount rates, but the relation is significantly below the one-to-one mapping implied by theory. We find that a 1 percentage point increase in the perceived cost of capital leads to a 0.4 percentage point increase in discount rates. We use a two-stage estimation procedure to ensure that these estimates are not subject to attenuation bias and we reject a slope coefficient of 1 with a high level of significance.

The imperfect relation between discount rates and the perceived cost of capital gives rise to a time-varying wedge between discount rates and the perceived cost of capital. In the US, this wedge has risen substantially over the last two decades because the perceived cost of capital has decreased while discount rates have remained relatively stable. Using within-firm variation, we find that the wedge has increased by around 2.5 percentage points between 2002 and 2021 for the average US firm in our sample. This increase is large relative
to typical movements on financial markets, for example due to secular forces and monetary policy. An increase of this magnitude is likely to be important for our understanding of investment dynamics, which we turn to next.

We first explore how discount rates relate to investment. We find that time variation in discount rates is strongly negatively related to investment, both at the firm and country level. Average discount rates and aggregate investment in the US in the past two decades strongly comove. At the firm level, we find that a one percentage point increase in the discount rate lowers the investment rate by -0.8 points. This estimate is robust to controlling for firm and year fixed effects, Tobin’s Q, the cost of capital, and other firm observables. We show that the magnitude is consistent with a simple Q-model where firms use the measured discount rates in investment decisions. The result suggests that our measured discount rates accurately capture a firm’s investment demand, conditional on its investment opportunities.

We next address how the large and rising discount rate wedges influence our understanding of the relation between aggregate investment and pricing in financial markets. A literature argues that US investment has been low in recent decades relative to the falling financial cost of capital. In particular, declines in the financial cost of capital have raised firms’ market value and thereby led to high and rising values of Tobin’s Q. According to standard Q-theory, investment should have risen with Tobin’s Q. However, if anything, observed investment rates have been low relative to historical standards, leading researchers to argue that there is “missing investment” summing to over 10 percent of the capital stock (Gutiérrez and Philippon 2017, Alexander and Eberly 2018).

We find that the evolution of discount rate wedges can account for a large part of the decoupling between Tobin’s Q and investment since 2002. Intuitively, the rising average discount rate wedge implies that firms are holding back increasingly more investment relative to what the financial and perceived cost of capital would suggest. To make this point precise, we develop an “adjusted Q,” which accurately captures firms’ investment demand in the presence of discount rate wedges. Using the adjusted Q, we find that the increase in the average discount rate wedge over the last decades is large enough to account for most of the missing investment. This finding does not imply that discount rate wedges fully explain the economic mechanisms behind missing investment. Rather, it suggests that investigating the drivers of discount rate wedges is useful for our understanding of why investment appears

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2The secular decline in the natural real rate of interest amounts to roughly 1 percentage point since 2002 (Bauer and Rudebusch 2020), whereas the decline in corporate bond yields due to the Fed’s quantitative easing events lay between 0 and 0.5 percentage points (Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jørgensen 2011, Swanson 2011).
lower than suggested by financial markets.\textsuperscript{3}

We discuss and test multiple theories of why discount rate wedges vary across firms and time. We consider three theories of cross-sectional variation in wedges, namely, theories related to the interaction of market power and managerial beliefs, risk, and financial constraints. First, we systematically analyze manager statements on conference calls. We find that many managers and investors believe that high discount rates attract investors and raise firm value. A high discount rate may serve as a signal of profitability or managerial prudence, consistent with models where investors worry about overinvestment by managers (Jensen 1986) and rely on salient signals to evaluate firms (Bordalo et al. 2022). While competitive forces likely eliminate such considerations in perfectly competitive markets, firms with market power are able to maintain them over time. Second, real options theory suggests that firms with irreversible investment should postpone investments in the face of increased risk and uncertainty (see, e.g., Abel and Eberly 1996), which can lead riskier firms to use higher discount rates (McDonald 2000). Third, the shadow costs of financial and managerial constraints may generate discount rate wedges (Jagannathan and Meier 2002). We find that measures of market power, risk, and financial constraints all have substantial power in explaining cross-sectional variation in discount rate wedges.

We also consider drivers of time variation in discount rate wedges. We find a strong role for market power. In particular, firms with high market power have kept their discount rates stable since 2002, despite the falling financial cost of capital. Firms without market power have, in contrast, decreased their discount rates almost one-to-one with the cost of capital. This pattern is consistent with the idea that many managers are averse to lowering their discount rates and only do so in response to competitive pressures. Firms with high market power, on the other hand, are free to keep their discount rates high as the cost of capital falls. Market power has thus limited the extent to which the secular decline in the financial cost of capital has been incorporated into firms’ discount rates. We also find that evidence that time variation in risk influences discount rate wedges through the real options channel, meaning that fluctuations in uncertainty (Baker et al. 2016) may have contributed to changes in discount rate wedges.

\textsuperscript{3}Discount rate wedges also generally shed light on the sensitivity of investment with respect to the financial cost of capital. We show that the wedges lower the sensitivity of investment by a factor of five in a simple Q-model. This finding may help to explain why macroeconomic models that abstract from such wedges need to assume sizable adjustment costs to match the investment elasticities estimated by, for example, Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) and Zwick and Mahon (2017).
Related Literature

Firms’ cost of capital and discount rates have long been thought to play a prominent role in understanding investment dynamics both among academics (e.g., Jorgenson 1963, Tobin 1969, Barro 1990, Cochrane 1991, Gilchrist and Zakrajšek 2012, Hall 2017, van Binsbergen and Opp 2019) and policymakers (Cieslak and Vissing-Jørgensen 2021). We provide the first dataset that links firms’ discount rates and perceived cost of capital to investment. Based on these data, we present evidence that discount rates indeed change with the cost of capital and influence investment. But we also document substantial wedges that impact the relation between discount rates, investment, and pricing on financial markets.

For the cost of capital to affect investment, three conditions must hold: (1) firms must incorporate the financial cost of capital into their perceived cost of capital, (2) the perceived cost of capital must affect discount rates, and (3) discount rates must influence investment. The literature offers several reasons why this chain may not operate as neatly as theory suggests. First, the financial cost of capital is difficult to estimate for rational agents (Fama and French 1997, Pástor and Stambaugh 1999, Welch and Goyal 2008) and even more so for behavioral actors (Greenwood and Shleifer 2014). Second, firms might choose discount rates that differ from the financial cost of capital, either because they believe there is mispricing in financial markets (Stein 1996) or to account for idiosyncratic risk (Dixit and Pindyck 1994, Abel and Eberly 1996, McDonald 2000, Décaire 2021). Consistent with these views, Sharpe and Suarez (2021) report survey evidence that some managers would not adjust their discount rates if interest rates changed, although they do not ask about the cost of equity. Third, managerial considerations apart from net present value might play a role in practice, unlike in simple models (Graham 2022). We contribute by providing direct evidence on each of these three conditions, allowing us to evaluate their empirical relevance.

Our results also inform a large literature that studies how pricing on secondary asset markets influences real outcomes (see the review in Bond et al. 2012). For instance, Krüger et al. (2015) and Dessaint et al. (2021) study how wedges between perceived and financial cost of capital cause real distortions; Pflueger et al. (2020) argue that pricing of risk in financial markets influences the cost of capital and investment; and a large literature in asset pricing explains equity anomalies assuming that firms invest based on expected stock returns (Zhang 2005, Hou et al. 2015, Gomes et al. 2003, Hennessy et al. 2007). Several papers discuss whether equity prices affect investment because firms can issue equity (e.g., Morck et al. 1990, Blanchard et al. 1993, Baker et al. 2003, Gilchrist et al. 2005, Jeenas and Lagos 2022). We find that the average firm incorporates equity prices into its perceived cost
of capital even when it does not issue equity, in line with the textbook model of corporate finance.

Existing evidence on firm discount rates comes from surveys. Summers (1986) reports discount rates for 95 firms in 1986, Poterba and Summers (1995) for 160 firms in 1990, and Jagannathan et al. (2016) for roughly 100 firms in 2003. The influential Duke CFO Survey provides broad insights into the practice of corporate governance (Graham and Harvey 2001). The survey has asked firms about their discount rates on five occasions between 2011 and 2019 (Graham 2022); around 130 observations of discount rates and 330 estimates of the perceived cost of capital are linked to financial data for listed firms. Our new dataset contains panel data on discount rates, the perceived cost of capital, and investment for 2,400 listed firms. This allows us to conduct dynamic within-firm analyses and to shed light on investment puzzles.

A further new feature of the dataset is that we observe firms’ perceived cost of equity over time. We can therefore assess how asset prices dynamically affect firms’ perceived cost of equity and discount rates. Other papers focus on cross-sectional variation in the cost of equity (Jagannathan et al. 2016, Gormsen and Huber 2022).

1 Conceptual Framework

Most investment projects incur costs today and are expected to earn revenue in the future. When deciding whether to undertake a project, firms therefore need to compare the value of different cash flows across time. The standard approach in economics and finance assumes that firms calculate the net present value (NPV) of projects and invest only in projects with positive NPV:

$$\text{NPV}_t = \sum_{s=0}^{S} \delta_t^{-s}(\text{Revenue}_{t+s} - \text{Cost}_{t+s}),$$

where \(\text{Revenue}_t\) and \(\text{Cost}_t\) are cash flows at time \(t\) and \(\delta_t\) is the discount factor for time \(t\). The discount factor measures how much firms value cash flows in a future period \(t\) relative to today. When firms adjust their discount factor, the number of projects with positive NPV and total investment change (keeping cash flows fixed).

In typical stylized models, economists assume that firms only use their financial cost of capital to inform their discount factors. This financial cost of capital reflects both the time
value of money and the riskiness of the firm’s assets. The stylized assumption is that:

$$\delta_t = 1 + r_t^{\text{fin}}$$

$$= 1 + \omega_t \times (1 - \tau) \times r_t^{\text{debt}} + (1 - \omega_t) \times r_t^{\text{equity}},$$

where $r_t^{\text{fin}}$ is the financial cost of capital. It is defined as the weighted average cost of debt and equity (WACC), where $r_t^{\text{debt}}$ and $r_t^{\text{equity}}$ are the cost of debt and equity, $\tau$ is the firm’s tax rate, and $\omega_t$ is the leverage ratio (i.e., the market value of debt relative to the market value of debt plus equity). The stylized assumption is based on the idea that the financial cost of capital is the optimal discount rate if firms want to maximize their market value, as long as the project under consideration carries the same risk as the firm’s existing investments.\(^4\)

In standard models, firms passively take their discount rate as given. However, in practice, firms need to actively calculate and set discount rates. Two internal processes within firms may cause discount rates to diverge from the financial cost of capital. First, firms cannot directly observe the financial cost of capital, but have to estimate it. Estimating long-run expected stock returns is difficult (Fama and French 1997, Pástor and Stambaugh 1999, Campbell and Thompson 2008) and practitioners are often taught simplifying assumptions (like a constant equity risk premium of 6 percent, Cochrane 2011). The cost of debt is easier to calculate, but still needs to be estimated based on bond prices and assumptions about default risk.

These factors make it likely that firms’ perceived cost of capital differs from the financial cost of capital. We define a “cost of capital wedge,” called $\nu$. The perceived cost of capital is the financial cost of capital plus $\nu$:

$$r_t^{\text{per}} = r_t^{\text{fin}} + \nu_t.$$  

In a second internal process, firms decide how to incorporate their perceived cost of capital into their discount rate. Existing surveys suggest that firms use discount rates that are substantially above the perceived cost of capital (Poterba and Summers 1995, Jagannathan et al. 2016, Graham 2022, see discussion in Section 5 for potential motives). We define the "discount rate wedge," $\kappa_t$, as the difference between the discount rate and the perceived cost

\(^4\)If project risk differs, the optimal discount rate is project-specific. However, if a firm on average carries out new projects that are in line with its existing ones, the average discount rate should still be close to the financial cost of capital.
of capital. This leads to the following expression:

\[ \delta_t = 1 + r_t^{\text{per.}} + \kappa_t \]

(5)

\[ = 1 + r_t^{\text{fin.}} + \upsilon_t + \kappa_t, \]

(6)

which says that the discount rate differs from the financial cost of capital both because of the cost of capital wedge and the discount rate wedge.

2 Measurement

Firms’ discount rates and perceived cost of capital are not observed in publicly available reports. We construct a new dataset that measures listed firms’ discount rates and perceived costs of capital, equity, and debt. Importantly, we combine these figures with measures of the financial cost of capital and firm investment, allowing us to shed light on how firms’ internal decisions comove with capital markets and real outcomes.

2.1 Extracting Paragraphs from Conference Calls

Our measurement relies on transcripts of corporate earnings conference calls. The majority of listed firms hold conference calls every quarter, so that managers can inform financial analysts, investors, and other observers about the firm’s strategy (Frankel et al. 1999, Hassan et al. 2019). We download all transcripts of conference calls for the period January 2002 to September 2021 available on the Thomson One database. We identify paragraphs that contain at least one keyword as well as one of the terms “percent,” “percentage,” or “%”. Details on the data extraction are in Appendix B.

It is difficult to train an algorithm to recognize discount rates and the perceived cost of capital from managers’ transcripts, as context and background are of the essence. Instead, we rely on manual data entry. We trained a team of research assistants to identify and record the relevant figures from the text. Overall, the team read 74,000 distinct paragraphs over the span of roughly 2 years.

The keywords are capital asset pricing model, cost of capital, cost of debt, cost of equity, discount rate, expect a return, expected rate of return, expected return, fudge factor, hurdle rate, internal rate of return, opportunity cost of capital, require a return, required rate of return, required return, return on assets, return on invested capital, return on net assets, weighted average cost of capital, weighted cost of capital. We also include abbreviations of the keywords in the search, for example, IRR.
2.2 Identifying Discount Rates and the Cost of Capital in Conference Calls

The discount rate defines the rate at which a firm values future cash flows. An equivalent interpretation is that a discount rate measures the lowest internal rate of return (IRR) that a firm is willing to accept on its investments (also known as hurdle rate). To see the equivalence, note that the expected rate of return on a project equals the discount rate if the NPV is zero and exceeds the discount rate if the NPV is positive. As a result, if a firm’s rule is to invest in projects where NPV is above zero, it equivalently chooses only projects where the expected return exceeds the discount rate. For the purposes of our measurement, the terms discount rate, minimum IRR, and hurdle rate all capture the same concept (see also Jagannathan et al. 2016).

There are three ways in which we identify discount rates. First, managers often state the required IRR for future investment projects. We only interpret an IRR as discount rate if it clearly refers to a required minimum rate as part of an investment rule. We separately record realized IRRs, when managers talk about current performance, and expected IRRs, when managers predict future performance without setting an explicit investment rule. Second, we interpret hurdle rates as discount rates if they are calculated on the basis of an IRR. Finally, managers sometimes define a discount rate based on a hurdle premium or fudge factor, which are added to the cost of capital. To ensure that we differentiate between discount rates and other rates, we record a range of additional variables from the conference calls, including required, expected, and realized returns on assets, on invested capital, and on equity.

To measure the perceived cost of capital, we study paragraphs where managers state their costs of equity, debt, and capital. These figures come from firms’ internal calculations, potentially relying on prices on capital markets and interest rates. We also consider abbreviations (e.g., WACC) and synonyms (e.g., required return on equity) as long as managers clearly relate them to financing costs.

2.3 Practical Measurement Guidelines

We begin with an example from a conference call held by the S&P 500 firm Air Products and Chemicals on September 17, 2015:

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6In line with standard theory, finance textbooks recommend that firms should make investment decisions using NPV. In practice, around 80 percent of firms follow this recommendation, according to surveys presented in Trahan and Gitman (1995), Graham and Harvey (2001), and Graham (2022). The second most common method involves comparing a project’s IRR to the minimum IRR.
“Our weighted average cost of capital for the company (...) is 8 percent. (...) We are not going to do any project which has a less than a 10 percent internal rate of return. (...) We have established a minimum hurdle rate of 10 percent internal rate of return for all new projects.”

From this paragraph, we record that the firm’s perceived cost of capital was 8 percent and its discount rate 10 percent, implying that the discount rate wedge \( \kappa_t = 2 \).

We detail the measurement guidelines in Appendix B. To summarize, we generally record only contemporaneous measures stated by firm managers and exclude figures that are historical, speculative, or posited by outsiders. A handful of firms mention multiple discount rates, for example, varying by country. We record the rate that represents most of the firm’s operations (e.g., the US discount rate for a firm with operations mainly in the US). We restrict the data collection to figures representative for the firm overall. For instance, if the manager of a mining company refers to the cost of debt from a particular bond issuance, we do not record the figure.

To ensure high quality and consistency across research assistants, we had weekly team meetings where we discussed specific paragraphs. Many paragraphs were read by two separate research assistants to ensure consistent entries across research assistants. All outlier observations (in levels and changes) for discount rates were checked by hand by the authors.

2.4 Measuring the Financial Cost of Capital

We amend the data from conference calls with the financial cost of capital. The cost of capital is the weighted average cost of debt and equity (equation 3). The cost of debt is calculated as the after-tax expected return on the firm’s debt. The cost of equity, which is the long-run expected stock return, is more complicated to calculate. At the firm level, the cost of equity is calculated as the country-level cost of equity adjusted for the firm’s relative riskiness. Below, we first explain how we estimate country-level cost of equity before explaining how we calculate the firm-level cost of equity. We note that estimating the firm-level cost of equity is associated with more uncertainty as it incorporates both uncertainty about the country-level cost of equity and the firm-level risk adjustment.
2.4.1 Financial Cost of Capital at the Country Level

We calculate the expected average equity return based on the balanced growth model. For each country in our sample, we calculate average 5-year earnings (based on all firms listed in the country) and compare these trailing five-year earnings to the total market capitalization to obtained the earnings yield.\(^7\) In the balanced growth model, long-run expected equity returns are:

\[
r_{\text{equity, country}}^t = \frac{\text{Earnings}_t}{\text{Price}_t} + g_t. \tag{7}
\]

We approximate \(g_t\) as 2 percent plus average inflation over the last two years.\(^8\) We approximate the cost of debt using the long-run (10 year) yield on government debt from the OECD and assuming a tax rate of 20 percent.

The country-level financial cost of capital is the average cost of debt and equity, weighted by average leverage in the country.

2.4.2 Financial Cost of Capital at the Firm Level

We use the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) to estimate the firm-level cost of equity. While the CAPM model does not fully explain long-run expected stock returns (Fama and French 1992), it is the model most commonly used by practitioners. The model says:

\[
E_{\text{CAPM}}[r_{\text{equity, firm}}^t] = r_f^t + \beta_{\text{firm}}^t \lambda_t, \tag{8}
\]

where \(r_f^t\) is the risk-free rate, \(\beta_{\text{firm}}^t\) is the market beta of the firm, and \(\lambda_t\) is the market risk premium. The market risk premium is the difference between \(r_{\text{equity, country}}^t\) and the risk-free rate, which is the short-term interest rate on government debt in the country. We estimate market betas in rolling five-year regressions of weekly data.\(^9\) We approximate the cost of

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\(^7\)In the US, we use the inverse of the CAPE ratio maintained by Robert Shiller as the earnings yield. We shrink the earnings yield towards the time series mean in each country outside the US by a Shrinkage factor of 0.5.

\(^8\)Ideally we would use expected inflation in this calculation. In the US, one can use break-even inflation as a measure of expected inflation, but such measures are not available for all countries in our sample. Using past 10-year inflation as a proxy for future inflation is common practice (e.g., the definition of Excess-CAPE by Robert Shiller). We shrink inflation towards the cross-sectional mean with a shrinkage factor of 0.5.

\(^9\)The use of weekly data differs from the practice in asset pricing research, where betas are often estimated using monthly data over five-year horizons.\(^10\) We use weekly data as this is more common among practitioners.
debt using total interest expenses in Compustat divided by total debt and assuming a tax rate of 20 percent.

2.5 Summary Statistics

The new dataset contains a diverse set of listed firms. Market value in the data ranges from 360 million USD at the 5th percentile to 54,163 at the 95th (Table 1, panel A). The data include some of the world’s largest corporations, including AT&T, Bank of America, Disney, Exxon, Home Depot, Intel, JPMorgan Chase, Mastercard, Nestle, Novartis, UnitedHealth, and Visa. The total market value of firms in the data was 31.1 trillion USD in 2019, which covers 42 percent of aggregate market value in advanced economies.

The data record roughly 2,400 observations on discount rates, 2,500 on cost of capital, 4,700 on cost of debt, and 400 on cost of equity. The sample contains 2,500 unique firms with at least one of these observations in the dataset. The raw average discount rate is 16 percent, the average cost of capital 8.5, the average cost of debt 4.5, and the average cost of equity 10 (nominal values in Table 1). The perceived cost of capital is distributed fairly symmetrically, while discount rates are more dispersed (Figure 1).

We plot raw data series in Figure 2. We show the average perceived cost of debt, perceived cost of capital, and discount rates for US firms over time. The perceived cost of debt has trended downward since 2002, in line with the global decrease in interest rates, while the perceived cost of capital has also fallen, but by less. Discount rates fluctuate over time but do not follow a secular trend.

Managers have incentives to report meaningful numbers on conference calls because the calls are held regularly and analysts can compare the reported discount rates to subsequently realized outcomes. Two pieces of evidence suggest that managers indeed report accurate numbers. First, a proxy for the true average cost of debt (interest expenses in Compustat) is almost identical to the average perceived cost of debt reported in different years. Second, we show in Section 4.1 that the relation between reported discount rates and firm-level changes in investment is quantitatively very close to the predictions of a simple model.

We study whether firms in the sample are similar to other firms in Compustat. We measure the percentile rank of each firm relative to other Compustat firms in the same year and country. We then calculate the average percentile rank of firms in our sample. If the sample followed the same distribution as the Compustat population, the average rank would be close to 50. We find that firms in the sample are relatively large, as their average market
value rank is 83. The unconditional probability of a Compustat firm being in our sample is roughly 3 percent, while it is roughly 50 percent for the 100 largest firms in Compustat. The selection of large firms is likely driven by the fact that conference calls of large firms are more likely to appear in Thomson One data. Firms in the sample are relatively close to the average in terms of book-to-market (average rank of 48) and investment rate (average rank of 54), while return on equity is marginally higher (average rank of 58).

3 Discount Rates, The Cost of Capital, and Wedges

In this section, we explore the relation between the financial cost of capital, the perceived cost of capital, and discount rates. A stylized theoretical view argues that they should all be equal and move in parallel (see Section 1). We present evidence that they comove, but less than one-to-one, giving rise to time-varying wedges.

3.1 The Perceived and the Financial Cost of Capital

We first analyze the association between the perceived cost of capital and the financial cost of capital. We use two measures of the financial cost of capital, as discussed in Section 2.4: a country-level and a firm-level measure. The country-level measure is the average financial cost of capital in a country and quarter. It captures aggregate variation in capital markets and interest rates over time.

We regress a firm’s perceived cost of capital on the country-level financial cost of capital in Table 2, panel A. We include country fixed effects in column 1 and firm fixed effects in column 2, so that the variation stems entirely from aggregate time-series fluctuations in capital markets and interest rates, which may be heterogeneous across countries. The stylized view of firms suggests that the point estimates should be 1. We find point estimates around 0.8, implying that when the financial cost of capital rises by 1 percentage point, the average firm increases its perceived cost of capital by 0.8 percentage points. R-squared is far from one, suggesting substantial heterogeneity in how the perceived cost of capital fluctuates across firms.

We next analyze the firm-level measure of the financial cost of capital in columns 3 and 4. This measure captures both aggregate variation and cross-sectional heterogeneity in exposure to aggregate fluctuations. We find point estimates of 0.6 and 0.5 that are, once again, statistically different from 0 and 1. The slightly lower estimates may be explained
by the estimation uncertainty inherent to the firm-level financial cost of capital (Section 2.4). Despite the slightly lower slope coefficient, R-squared increases slightly, since now we also capture cross-sectional variation. Nonetheless, it is far from 1, suggesting substantial heterogeneity in perceptions across firms. We find that firms incorporate variation in the cost of equity and cost of debt to a similar degree in columns 5 and 6. Since we use delevered measures, the stylized view would again suggest that both coefficients are 1.

We explore how firms form their perceived costs of debt and equity in more detail in Table 2, panel B. We find that a long-run interest rate on government debt in the country and current interest expenses of the firm (normalized by outstanding debt) have strong predictive power, while leverage and beta do not (controlling for firm fixed effects). This suggests that the perceived cost of debt comoves with long-run country-level and current firm-level interest rates.

We also explore the perceived cost of equity in more detail. In Figure 3, we plot the perceived cost of equity along with three potential estimates for the financial cost of equity. The green line assumes a constant equity risk premium of 6 percent, which is sometimes taught to MBA students (Cochrane 2011). The two red lines use more sophisticated estimates based on the CAPE measures maintained by Robert Shiller. One of these is our baseline estimate of expected returns in the US, namely, the earnings yield plus a nominal growth rate of 4 percent (the historical average, see Section 2.4). The other estimate is the earnings yield plus a bullish expected growth rate of 6 percent. The perceived cost of equity reported by firms is most closely aligned with the estimate based on CAPE and a high growth rate.

Taken together, the data imply that firms partially incorporate changes in the financial cost of capital into their perceptions but not quite one-to-one. As a result, the cost of capital wedge $\nu$ (difference between perceived and financial cost of capital) varies over time.

As an example of this behavior, we quote a conference call of IAG (the parent company of British Airways and Iberian). IAG increased their perceived cost of equity in response to the European sovereign debt crisis in 2011, but did not lower it by as much as capital markets would have suggested after the crisis. This has implicitly raised their cost of capital wedge:

2014-11-07, IAG, Enrique Dupuy, CFO: “We are still keeping a cost of capital of 10 percent and this is getting very conservative. We had to make a fine tuning exercise through the crisis in Spain and Europe a couple of years ago (...) and we increased the figure to this 10 percent level. But I think the assumptions are now behind (...) the 15 percent cost of
equity, it appears to have a big, big premium there. Maybe those figures could be brought down slightly so 10 percent, we are keeping it there as a reference. We may be having to change it through '15 and beyond. [edited for ease of understanding]”

3.2 Discount Rates and the Perceived Cost of Capital

We examine how discount rates move with the perceived cost of capital. We first plot pooled country-level averages of discount rates against the perceived cost of capital. There is a strong positive relation, suggesting that countries where firms perceive the cost of capital to be high are also countries with high discount rates.

We examine within-country variation in Table 3. We initially use only observations where managers report both the discount rate and the perceived cost of capital on the same conference call. When using broad variation across firms and time in column 1, we find that firms whose perceived cost of capital is 1 percentage point higher have a discount rate that is 0.8 percentage points greater. The estimate is roughly 0.4 when including firm and firm plus year fixed effects. This implies that when a firm’s perceived cost of capital changes by 1 percentage point, relative to other firms in the same year and relative to the firm’s previous perceived cost, the firm adjusts its discount rate by 0.4 percentage points.

To explore the relation for a larger set of firms, we construct a predicted value for a firm’s perceived cost of capital. The predicted value is based on a lasso procedure that allows for full interactions of all components of the financial cost of capital (risk-free interest rate, beta, equity risk premium, leverage). We find similar point estimates when using the estimates of the perceived cost of capital as regressors in columns 3 to 6, although R-squared and standard errors are larger due to the estimated first stage. One advantage of this two-stage approach is that we avoid potential concerns about attenuation bias in the slope coefficient.

The stylized view posits that firms passively adopt their perceived cost of capital as discount rate, so that they should move one-to-one. We can reject a slope of 1 in all specifications using within-firm variation, suggesting that firms only partially incorporate the fluctuations in the perceived cost of capital into discount rates. The following quote from a Fortune 500 CFO illustrates this behavior:

2014-09-17, Spectra Energy, John Patrick Reddy, CFO: “We didn’t lower our hurdle rates in conjunction [with the past decrease in interest rates]. We lowered them somewhat but not just all the way down with long-term rates at 2.5 percent. We didn’t take our hurdle rates
down to 5 percent, for example. We are still looking at returns of, say 10 percent, on average for our projects.”

This partial incorporation implies that the discount rate wedge $\kappa$ (difference between discount rate and perceived cost of capital) varies over time. We illustrate the time series behavior of $\kappa$ in the US by controlling for time-invariant variation across firms. To do so, we first regress firm discount rates on year and firm fixed effects. We measure the average “within-firm” discount rate in every year by adding the year fixed effect to the unconditional mean. We follow an analogous procedure to create the average “within-firm” perceived cost of capital in every year. The difference between the two series is the “within-firm” discount rate wedge $\kappa$.

We plot the average within-firm $\kappa$ in Figure 5. The wedge has increased by roughly 2.5 percentage points between 2002 and 2021. This is a large change, relative to historical movements in equity returns, interest rates, and policy rates. Much of the divergence since 2010 is driven by the fact that the perceived cost of capital has fallen while discount rates have only partially incorporated this trend and remained relatively stable. The wedge fluctuated up and down around the financial crisis, peaking in 2008.

4 Discount Rates and Investment

In this section, we analyze how discount rates and discount rate wedges relate to investment. We first study the relation between firm-level discount rates and investment. We then highlight that time-varying discount rate wedges shed light on aggregate investment dynamics and, in particular, the recent phenomenon of “missing investment.”

4.1 Firm-Level Investment and Discount Rates

We plot the average discount rate in the US, measured in the conference call data, against aggregate net investment in Figure 6. The data suggest that discount rates and investment comove.

Table 4 reports regressions of firm-level net capital investment on firm-level discount rates. All regressions include firm fixed effects, so estimates are driven by within-firm variation over time. Across a range of specifications, slope coefficients are -0.8 or -0.9. The result is stable when we control for year fixed effects in column 2, the financial cost of capital in columns
3 and 4, and Tobin’s Q in columns 5 and 6. We therefore find that a firm that raises its
discount rate by one percentage point more lowers its net investment rate by -0.8 percentage
points more, relative to the same firm in previous years, other firms in the same year, and
even when its financial cost of capital and Tobin’s Q are unchanged. The stability with
respect to the financial cost of capital and Tobin’s Q implies that the cost of capital and
discount rate wedges have an independent effect on investment. Two other measures of
investment, the change in total assets in Table A.I and net investment on intangibles and
capital in Table A.II, also comove with discount rates.

The results suggest that discount rates accurately measure firms’ investment demand
(holding constant the cash flow of its investment opportunities). In Appendix C, we study
a simple Q-model of firm investment with discount rates. Under conservative assumptions
about adjustment costs following Philippon (2009) and assuming a duration of Tobin’s Q
of 25 years, the model predicts a slope coefficient between -0.8 and -0.9, in line with our
estimate.

4.2 Adjusted Q and “Missing Investment”

A recent literature argues that US investment has been low in recent decades relative to the
falling financial cost of capital. The argument is usually made using Q-theory. Declines in
the financial cost of capital have raised firms’ equity market value and thereby led to high
and rising values of Tobin’s Q. According to standard Q-theory, investment should have
risen with Tobin’s Q. However, if anything, observed investment rates have been low relative
to historical standards, leading researchers to argue that there is “missing investment”
(Gutiérrez and Philippon 2017, Alexander and Eberly 2018).

We argue that the evolution of discount rate wedges can account for a large part of the
decoupling between Tobin’s Q and investment. Intuitively, the large and increasing discount
rate wedges implies that firms are holding back investment relative to what the financial cost
of capital would suggest. To make this point precise, we first introduce a model to develop
an ”adjusted Q,” which accurately captures firms’ investment incentives in the presence of
time-varying wedges. We then measure adjusted Q using our new dataset and analyze its
relation to aggregate investment.
4.2.1 A Model of Adjusted Q

The firm chooses optimal investment $I_t$ by maximizing the discounted value of future profits net of investment costs. The firm discounts cash flows using $\delta = 1 + r^{\text{fin.}} + v + \kappa$ (i.e., the sum of the financial cost of capital, a cost of capital wedge, and a discount rate wedge). The firm’s problem is:

$$V_t(v + \kappa, k_t) = \max_{I_t} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \frac{\Pi_t(k_t) - I_t - \Phi(I_t, k_t)}{(1 + r^{\text{fin.}} + v + \kappa)^t}$$

subject to

$$k_{t+1} = I_t + (1 - \xi)k_t$$

where $\Pi_t(k_t)$ is profits earned at time $t$ using $k_t$ units of capital, $I_t$ is investment at time $t$, $\xi$ is the depreciation rate of capital, and $V_t(v + \kappa, k_t)$ is the discounted value of the firm. The function $\Phi(I_t, k_t)$ captures adjustment costs, which are quadratic in net investment:

$$\Phi(I_t, k_t) = \frac{\phi}{2} \left( \frac{I_t}{k_t} - \xi \right)^2 k_t,$$

where $\phi \in \mathbb{R}^+$ governs the magnitude of adjustment costs. Optimal investment (see Appendix D for derivations) is:

$$\frac{I_t}{k_t} - \xi = \frac{1}{\phi}(q_t - 1),$$

where $q_t$ is the Lagrange multiplier that captures the marginal value of capital:

$$q_t = \frac{\delta V_t(v + \kappa, k_t)}{\delta k_{t+1}}.$$

The marginal value of capital $q_t$ is not observable without additional assumptions. The literature usually follows Hayashi (1982) and assumes that the production and cost functions are homogeneous of degree one. In this case, the marginal value of capital equals the average value of capital, denoted $Q_t$:

$$q_t = \frac{\delta V_t(v + \kappa, k_t)}{\delta k_{t+1}} = \frac{V_t(v + \kappa, k_t)}{k_{t+1}} = Q_t.$$

We can thus measure $q_t$ as the value of the firm’s capital relative to its replacement value. We emphasize that $V_t(v + \kappa, k_t)$ is calculated using $1 + r^{\text{fin.}} + v + \kappa$ as the discount rate.
If $\nu + \kappa = 0$, such that the firm uses the financial cost of capital as its discount rate, we can estimate $q_t$ on financial markets using Tobin’s Q. Otherwise, however, one must correct Tobin’s Q to obtain the marginal value of capital in the eyes of the firm, as summarized in the next proposition.

**Proposition 1 (Adjusted Q).** If the production and investment cost functions are homogeneous of degree one, the shadow cost of capital can be approximated as:

\[
q_t \sim Q^\text{Tobin}_t \times \frac{1}{(\nu + \kappa) \times \text{Dur} + 1},
\]

where Dur is the duration of the firm’s future cash flows calculated using $r^{\text{fin}}$. as the discount rate. See Appendix D for the definition and proof.

If the wedges sum to zero ($\nu + \kappa = 0$), we can approximate marginal $q$ using Tobin’s Q. Intuitively, firms and financial markets use the same discount rate in this case and therefore agree on the value of the profits produced by capital. If the wedges are non-zero ($\nu + \kappa \neq 0$), we need to adjust Tobin’s Q downwards because the firm uses a higher discount rate than the market, causing the firm to put a lower value on capital than the market. The strength of the adjustment naturally depends on the magnitude of the wedges, but also on the duration of the cash flows. Indeed, it is well known that the impact of the discount rate on the value of an asset depends on the duration of the asset’s cash flows, which is calculated as the weighted time to maturity of the future cash flows. The longer the duration (i.e., the further into the future the average cash flow is earned), the larger the effect of discount rates on the value of the asset. For this reason, the effect of wedges increases with the duration of the firm’s cash flows.

### 4.2.2 Empirical Analysis of Adjusted Q

We empirically implement the adjustment to Q for the average US firm. We calculate Tobin’s Q using flow of funds data, following the method in Crouzet and Eberly (2022). We calculate adjusted Q by inserting the average observed discount rate wedge ($\kappa_t$) for every year in the adjustment factor.$^{11}$ We calculate the average duration over our sample based on the duration of the firms outstanding debt and equity (see Appendix D).

$^{11}$We set the cost of capital wedge ($\nu_t$) equal to zero for this exercise, so that uncertainty in estimating the financial cost of capital does not affect the results.
Figure 7 plots Tobin’s Q along with our new adjusted Q. Tobin’s Q is well above 1 and rises throughout the sample. Standard Q-theory would therefore predict high and rising investment throughout the sample. In contrast, adjusted Q is close to 1 and relatively stable. Adjusted Q thus corresponds more closely to the relatively low investment observed during this period.

We further explore whether the variation in discount rate wedges and adjusted Q is large enough to account for missing investment by repeating the analysis of Gutiérrez and Philippon (2017). We first estimate the relation between aggregate investment and Tobin’s Q in the years 1990 to 2002. We then predict what investment since 2002 would have been if the relation between Tobin’s Q and investment had remained constant. The difference between actual investment and predicted investment is missing investment, the cumulative shortfall in investment since 2002 due to the decoupling between Tobin’s Q and observed investment. The blue line in Figure 8 shows that this shortfall has reached roughly 20 percent of the capital stock.

We repeat the exercise using adjusted Q. To estimate the relation between adjusted Q and investment in the pre-2002 sample, we need to estimate the discount rate wedge during this period. We exploit survey data from Poterba and Summers (1995) to calculate a discount rate wedge of around 3.5 percent in 1990 and linearly interpolate between this estimate and our observed wedge in 2003. The red line shows that the investment shortfall relative to adjusted Q is relatively smaller and close to zero. Accordingly, the investment behavior of firms is consistent with standard investment models, once we recognize that firms use discount rates that deviate from the perceived cost of capital.

Taken together, the analysis suggests that the evolution of discount rate wedges is sizable enough to account for a large part of missing investment in the 21st century. Understanding why discount rate wedges exist and why they have expanded in recent times is therefore likely to be fruitful for our understanding of seemingly low investment in recent years. We analyze this question in depth in Section 5 but, before doing so, we analyze the sensitivity of investment to the financial cost of capital more generally.

12Poterba and Summers report an average real discount rate of 12.2 percent in 1990, which is approximately 1 percentage point lower than the real discount rate we observe in 2003. We further estimate that the real financial cost of capital fell by approximately 2 percentage points between 1990 and 2003. Taken together, these estimates suggest that the wedge in 1990 was 3 percentage points lower than in 2003 (where we observe a wedge of 6.5). Summers (1986) documents an average real discount rate of 10 percent in 1986, consistent with low discount rate wedges around 1990.

13In Table A.III, we show the underlying regressions. There is no statistically significant investment shortfall after 2002 conditional on adjusted Q.
4.3 Adjusted Q and the Sensitivity of Investment to the Financial Cost of Capital

The sensitivity of investment to the financial cost of capital determines the real effects of a range of shocks (including capital market fluctuations, monetary policy, corporate taxes, etc.). We use the model of adjusted Q in Section 4.2.1 to calculate how the cost of capital and discount rate wedges affect the investment sensitivity. We approximate the effect of the cost of capital on net investment (following Proposition 2) as:

\[
\frac{\Delta \left( \frac{R}{k_t} - \delta \right)}{\Delta r_{\text{fin.}}} = \Delta \left( \frac{R}{k_t} - \delta \right) \frac{\Delta \delta}{\Delta r_{\text{fin.}}} \sim \frac{\Delta \delta}{\Delta r_{\text{fin.}}} \times \frac{1}{\phi} \times \frac{\text{Dur}}{\rho + \kappa \times \text{Dur} + 1}.
\]

(14)

Two channels dampen the investment sensitivity when wedges are positive: the wedge channel and the duration channel. The wedge channel is related to the ratio \(\frac{\Delta \delta}{\Delta r_{\text{fin.}}}\). This ratio is generally smaller than one in the data and therefore reduces the investment sensitivity. To isolate the duration channel, imagine that firms incorporate changes in the financial cost of capital one-to-one into discount rates (i.e., \(\frac{\Delta \delta}{\Delta r_{\text{fin.}}} = 1\)). In this case, positive wedges \((\rho + \kappa > 0)\) reduce the duration of cash flows. In turn, this lowers the sensitivity of investment to discount rate movements.

Figure A.11 shows the sensitivity of the financial cost of capital on investment rates under different assumptions. Here, we measure the sensitivity as the semi-elasticity, in line with much of the literature, which is defined as the percentage change in gross investment relative to a 1 percentage point change in the financial cost of capital.\(^{14}\) In a model with zero wedges, the semi-elasticity is 0.25. It falls to 0.12 when we incorporate the average observed discount rate wedge of 8 percentage points in the data. It further drops to 0.05 if we also add the duration channel. These numbers suggest that discount rate wedges can have first-order impact on the investment sensitivity.

5 Drivers of Discount Rates and Wedges

We have so far established that there exist time-varying wedges between the perceived cost of capital and discount rates that are large enough to have quantitatively important implications for investment dynamics. In this section, we discuss and test theories explaining why

\(^{14}\text{We assume a cash flow duration of 25 years (see Appendix D) and that }\phi = 10, \text{ following Philippon (2009).}\)
there exist positive wedges and then show which factors have driven changes in wedges since 2002.

5.1 Theoretical Explanations for Discount Rate Wedges

5.1.1 Market Power and Beliefs about Value Creation

We first discuss how market power can enable firms to maintain positive discount rate wedges. In a standard frictionless model, market power on its own does not imply that firms should use positive discount rate wedges. Firms with market power cannibalize existing revenue if they set lower discount rates and invest more, but this cannibalization effect enters the firm’s NPV calculation through expected cash flows and not through discount rates.

Market power may nonetheless play an important role because it enables firms to maintain positive discount rate wedges in equilibrium. A number of factors, outlined below, suggest that managers want to set high discount rates to benefit themselves or investors. However, high discount rates are not sustainable in a perfectly competitive market equilibrium because one firm can profitably deviate by lowering its discount rate to the perceived cost of capital. This deviation would lead the deviating firm to increase investment, lower the product market price, and increase the deviating firm’s profits. All other firms in the market would then have to follow suit and lower their discount rates to survive. Market pressures should therefore lead positive discount rate wedges to disappear in competitive markets.

In contrast, firms with market power do not face these competitive pressures and find it easier to maintain positive discount rate wedges. Three types of managerial beliefs about value creation may explain why firms with market power prefer to keep discount rates above the financial cost of capital.

Signaling High Returns  There is a widely held belief among managers and investors that discount rate wedges raise firm value. We systematically categorize all conference calls where managers discussed or justified why they maintained wedges. The most common type of explanation, mentioned on 59 percent of relevant calls, was that discount rates above the cost of capital contribute to firm value, either because only projects with returns far above the cost of capital add value, generate profits, and are demanded by investors.\(^\text{15}\) Recent models of information acquisition can explain why high discount rates are attractive. A high

\(^{15}\)The total number of calls where managers justified a positive discount rate wedge was 123. The second most common explanation after value was risk and uncertainty, discussed below, with 33 percent.
discount rate is equivalent to, and usually framed by managers as, a high internal rate of return. A high return sounds appealing. Typical investors want to maximize their returns on investment, so they may easily draw the analogue that a firm with high project returns is value-creating. Formally, a firm’s return (i.e., its discount rate) may act as a salient stimulus that attracts investors (Bordalo et al. 2022 and investors may rely on a simplified, sparse set of firm characteristics to guide investment (Gabaix 2014).

**Signaling Prudence** Managers use discount rate wedges to signal prudence. Investors often worry about overinvestment and empire-building by managers (Jensen 1986). One way of signalling that the firm will not overinvest is to use high, “conservative” wedges. Managers also face uncomfortable questions when a project earns less than the cost of capital and introduce wedges as insurance. (See Appendix E for quotes from conference calls signaling prudence.)

**Value to Managers** Finally, a high discount rate may create value for the managers themselves, even if it does not benefit firm value and investors. Specifically, managers are often more exposed to the idiosyncratic performance of their firm than investors, for example due to firm-specific human capital or their compensation schemes. Managers may therefore want the firm to be less risky than the risk implied by the financial cost of capital, so they set higher discount rates and invest less.

Taken together, a testable implication of these theories is that firms with market power have higher discount rate wedges and that firms with market power maintain high discount rates even when their perceived cost of capital falls.

### 5.1.2 Risk and Uncertainty

A firm’s financial cost of capital should generally capture the compensation for risk required by investors. However, there are a number of reasons why firms might incorporate risk into their discount rates over and above the financial cost of capital. First, real option theory shows that when investment projects are risky and (fully or partially) irreversible, the optimal investment decision depends on the uncertainty of the cash flows (Ingersoll Jr. and Ross 1992, Dixit and Pindyck 1994, Abel and Eberly 1996). The more uncertainty, the longer the firm should postpone investing. While in theory, the optimal investment decision uses the financial cost of capital as discount rate, a firm can approximate optimal behavior by increasing its wedge in the face of uncertainty (McDonald 2000). Real options theory
therefore implies that firms with more uncertain projects have higher wedges in the cross section.

Second, if a firm’s new projects are systematically riskier than its current projects, the firm should use positive discount rate wedges when evaluating new projects. Third, if equity is mispriced, managers may want to adjust discount rates by incorporating corrected risk factors (Stein 1996).

The 2021 Association of Finance Professionals Survey finds that close to half of respondents increase discount rates in the face of increased uncertainty. Similarly, 33 percent of relevant conference calls argue that a positive discount rate wedge is needed to account for risk and uncertainty. The following quote gives an example of such behavior:

2016-11-10, Halyard Health Inc., Steve Voskuil, CFO: “...So that’s kind of how we come to the 9 percent [hurdle rate]. We start with the capital markets’ rates and look at our capital structure, and then we add a little bit to that to reflect risk in the portfolio and execution.”

5.1.3 Financial and Organizational Constraints

Firms may face constraints that are not normally included in NPV analyses. Firms can incorporate these constraints by adding the shadow price of the constraint to their discount rate. For instance, Jagannathan and Meier (2002) argue that firms facing organizational constraints should include the shadow cost of managerial attention in their discount rates. Similarly, firms facing financial frictions might want to include the shadow cost of capital over and above their financial cost of capital.

This theory predicts that firms with more constraints are more likely to have higher discount rates and wedges. The following quote illustrates how financial constraints can affect discount rates:

2016-10-19, Kinder Morgan, Kim Dang, CFO: “We are living within our cash flow, meaning that we want to be able to fund our CapEx and our dividend from our cash flow. And so that is the constraint, and so, because we have a limited amount of capital, that is why we have the hurdle rate set at 15 percent IRR for projects.”
5.1.4 Cash Flow Inflation

Managers may worry that internal cash flow forecasts are excessively optimistic. By using higher discount rates, they can correct for such inflation. However, investors and analysts generally expect firms to earn their discount rate on their marginal project, and managers are often asked to compare their realized returns to their discount rate. Adjusting for earnings inflation through the discount rate may apply more frequently to private firms or small firms that do not hold regular conference calls. (Large firms that frequently face interactions with investors can counteract cash flow inflation by adjusting expected growth rates instead of discount rates.)

5.2 Testing Cross-Sectional Variation in Discount Rates and Wedges

The theories above predicted that, in the cross section, firms with higher market power, risk, and financial constraints maintain greater discount rates and greater wedges. We measure firm-level market power using the accounting method in Baqae and Farhi (2020), risk using one-year option implied equity volatility, and financial constraints using the index by Hadlock and Pierce (2010). Since we are initially interested in cross-sectional variation, we average these variables for the period 2000 to 2002 and include country and year fixed effects in the regressions. Variables are standardized, so that coefficients estimate the impact of a one standard deviation increase.

In Table 5, we find that firms with greater market power have higher discount rates (column 1), higher discount rate wedges (column 2), and higher total wedges (discount rate wedge plus cost of capital wedge, column 3). The coefficients are statistically significant and economically large. Similarly, riskier firms also have statistically and economically higher discount rates and wedges. The coefficients on financial constraints are all positive and economically significant, but only the association with the total wedge is statistically significant. Together, the variables explain 18 percent of total variation in discount rates.

5.3 The Drivers of Changes in Discount Rates and Wedges

We next study time variation in discount rates and wedges. We show that variation in market power across firms accounts for which firms have driven the secular increase in discount rate wedges since 2002. Moreover, we argue that changes in risk likely explain short-run

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16We find similar results using the measure of market power by De Loecker et al. (2020).
fluctuations in discount rate wedges.

5.3.1 Market Power and Rising Discount Rate Wedges

Firms with high market power are less likely to adjust discount rates when the financial cost of capital falls as they face less competitive pressure to do so (see Section 5.1.1). Consistent with this argument, we find that firms with high market power have kept their discount rates steady in recent decades while firms with low market power have decreased their discount rates as the cost of capital has gone down.

We first illustrate this finding using a simple sample cut. We split the sample into two groups based on firms’ average market power between 2000 and 2002. We measure market power using accounting profits, as in Baqae and Farhi (2020), but the results are robust to using the measure in De Loecker et al. (2020). We calculate the average discount rate in each year separately for each group. We do so in firm-year panel regressions that include firm fixed effects, such that the results are driven by within-firm variation in discount rates (as in Section 3.2).

Figure 9 plots the resulting time series of discount rates for the high- and low-market power groups. Discount rates of firms with high market power are relatively stable since 2002 and, if anything, increase slightly, even though the financial cost of capital has trended downward over this period. In contrast, discount rates of firms with low market power have fallen. These patterns are consistent with the view that competitive pressures force firms to adjust discount rates with decreases in the financial cost of capital.

We test these dynamics formally in Table 6. We regress firm-level discount rates and wedges on a series of interaction terms. We include firm fixed effects so results are again driven by within-firm variation in discount rates and wedges over time. We first interact market power with a time trend. The results show that firms with higher market power in 2002 increased their discount rate (column 1) and their wedges (columns 4 and 7) by significantly more between 2002 and 2021. The point estimate implies that a standard deviation increase in market power is associated with a 2.5 percentage point increase in the discount rate wedge over the sample.

We next interact market power with the country-level average perceived cost of capital, finding that firms with higher market power also reacted significantly more to changes in the financial cost of capital (columns 2, 5, and 8). The magnitude is such that a firm whose market power is one standard deviation higher incorporates a percentage point shock to the cost of capital by 0.43 percentage points less. The interaction of market power with the
firm-level financial cost of capital also supports this conclusion, although estimates are less precise (columns 3, 6, and 9).

Taken together, these results are consistent with the view that market power has limited the extent to which firms have incorporated the secular decline in the financial cost of capital into discount rates.

### 5.3.2 Time-Varying Risk and Discount Rate Wedges

Real options theories suggest one mechanism through which risk may influence discount rate wedges, as explained in Section 5.1.2. According to these theories, time variation in risk should influence wedges more strongly for firms with more irreversible projects. To test this prediction, we interact a firm’s option-implied volatility in a given year with a time-invariant measure of asset irreversibility at the industry level (Kim and Kung 2017).\(^{17}\) We also include firm fixed effects. In Table 7, we report that changes in volatility affect firms with high irreversibility more strongly. The interaction effect is statistically significant for the discount rate wedge (column 2) and the total wedge (column 3). These results support the view that time variation in risk leads to time variation in wedges through the real options channel.

Option-implied volatility and economic policy uncertainty (Baker et al. 2016) have fluctuated significantly in recent years, implying that short-run variation in discount rate wedges may be explained by changes in risk and uncertainty. Specifically, both implied volatility and policy uncertainty increased before and during the financial crisis 2008, a time when discount rate wedges peaked. Moreover, to the extent that economic policy uncertainty has trended slightly upward in recent decades, uncertainty may have also contributed to the upward trend in the wedge.\(^ {18}\)

### 6 Conclusion

This paper presents a new dataset on firms’ discount rates and perceived cost of capital, augmented with measures of the financial cost of capital and investment. We find that firms partially incorporate changes in the financial cost of capital into their perceived cost of capital.

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\(^{17}\) We measure asset irreversibility as the average between 2000 and 2002.

\(^{18}\) This finding is distinct from the increasing risk premia studied by Farhi and Gourio (2018). Risk premia influence discount rates through the impact on the financial cost of capital whereas the impact of uncertainty on wedges generates a distinct, and potentially larger, impact on discount rates.
capital. In addition, discount rates move with the perceived cost of capital, but significantly less than one-to-one. These patterns lead to large and time-varying wedges between discount rates and the financial cost of capital. Moreover, we find that discount rates are strongly negatively related to investment.

Discount rate wedges have trended upward substantially in recent decades. The average firm in our sample has increased its discount rate wedge by 2.5 percentage points between 2002 and 2021. This pattern affects our understanding of aggregate investment dynamics. The large and growing wedge suggests that firms have invested less relative to what we would expect given the financial cost of capital. The magnitude of this effect is large. Using a new adjusted Q-model, we show that the increase in the average wedge is large enough to account for the low levels of aggregate investment (relative to valuations in financial markets) observed in recent decades.

In exploring the drivers of discount rate wedges, we find important roles for both market power and risk. Riskier firms add higher wedges to their cost of capital, consistent with theories based on real options. Firms with high market power also add higher wedges. In addition, we find that the upward trend in discount rate wedges has been driven by firms with high market power. While firms with high market power have increased their wedges over the sample, firms with low market power have decreased their discount rates almost one-to-one with the change in the financial cost of capital, implying that their wedges have been relatively constant over time. These results suggest that market power has limited the extent to which the secular decline in the financial cost of capital has been incorporated into discount rates.
References


Gormsen, N. J. and K. Huber (2022): “Equity Factors and Firms’ Perceived Cost of Capital.”


Table 1
Summary Statistics on Corporate Discount Rates from Conference Calls

This table reports summary statistics of metrics extracted from the earnings conference calls. Panel A reports summary statistics of variables from the conference calls as well as characteristics of included firms. Panel B reports a broader set of characteristics of included firms, where characteristics are measured in cross-sectional percent of the universe of firms (controlling for year and country of listing).

<table>
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<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
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<th>(4)</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>P5</td>
<td>P95</td>
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<td>4,668</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>0.016</td>
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<td>Perceived cost of equity</td>
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<td>Market value (million USD)</td>
<td>6,612</td>
<td>13.521</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>54,163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return on equity</td>
<td>5,780</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>-0.063</td>
<td>0.28</td>
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Panel B: Characteristics of included firms (percentile of all Compustat firms)

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<td>N</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>P5</td>
<td>P95</td>
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<tr>
<td>Market value (percentile)</td>
<td>6,612</td>
<td>82.5</td>
<td>45.0</td>
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<td>Book-to-market (percentile)</td>
<td>5,480</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>5.63</td>
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<td>Return on equity (percentile)</td>
<td>6,360</td>
<td>58.4</td>
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<td>Physical capital (percentile)</td>
<td>6,177</td>
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<td>Investment rate (percentile)</td>
<td>5,636</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>87.5</td>
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Table 2
The Perceived and the Financial Cost of Capital

This table reports results of panel regressions of the firm-quarter level perceived cost of capital on measures of the financial cost of capital at the firm and country level (see Section 2.4 for definitions). Standard errors are double-clustered by year and country. The sample is 2002 to 2021. The left- and right-hand side variables are measured in percentage points.

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<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Financial WACC (country-level)</td>
<td>0.88***</td>
<td>0.67***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Financial WACC (firm-level)</td>
<td>0.64***</td>
<td>0.49***</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
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<td>Delevered Cost of Equity (firm)</td>
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<td>(0.16)</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Delevered Cost of Debt (firm)</td>
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<td>0.54***</td>
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<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>5.24***</td>
<td>4.88***</td>
<td>5.65***</td>
<td>4.69***</td>
<td>5.70***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(0.59)</td>
<td>(0.71)</td>
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<td>1,520</td>
<td>2,058</td>
<td>1,520</td>
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<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
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<td>0.803</td>
<td>0.128</td>
<td>0.801</td>
<td>0.131</td>
<td>0.801</td>
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<td>Country</td>
<td>Firm</td>
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<td>Firm</td>
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<tr>
<td>Within R2</td>
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<td>0.070</td>
<td>0.088</td>
<td>0.092</td>
<td>0.091</td>
<td>0.093</td>
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<th>Panel B</th>
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<tr>
<td>Long-Term Rates (country-level)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interest expense (firm-level)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Leverage ratio</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Beta</td>
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<td>Constant</td>
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<td>Within R2</td>
<td>0.41</td>
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Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3
Discount Rates and the Perceived Cost of Capital

This table reports results of panel regressions of the firm-quarter level discount rates on the perceived cost of capital,

\[ \text{Discount rate}_i^t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Perc. cost of capital}_i^t + \nu_i^t \]

where \( i \) denotes firm and \( t \) denotes time. The three left-most columns use the perceived cost of capital measured in conference calls on the right-hand side. The three rightmost columns use the predicted perceived cost of capital based on the financial cost of capital. The predicted perceived cost of capital is calculated based on a lasso regression as explained in the text. The sample runs from 2002 to 2021. Standard errors are double-clustered by firm and year. The left- and right-hand side variables are measured in percentage points.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
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<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perceived WACC (firm-level)</td>
<td>0.79***</td>
<td>0.44***</td>
<td>0.38***</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.076)</td>
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<td>(0.12)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Predicted perc. WACC (Lasso)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1.10**</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.40*</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.42)</td>
<td>(0.26)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>4.61***</td>
<td>7.75***</td>
<td>8.20***</td>
<td>6.42*</td>
<td>12.3***</td>
<td>12.6***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.81)</td>
<td>(1.01)</td>
<td>(1.01)</td>
<td>(3.60)</td>
<td>(2.21)</td>
<td>(1.93)</td>
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<td>127</td>
<td>1,873</td>
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<td>1,388</td>
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<td>0.984</td>
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<td>0.967</td>
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<td>Firm/year</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Firm</td>
<td>Firm/year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P(slope = 1)</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.00012</td>
<td>0.00010</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>0.016</td>
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<tr>
<td>Within R2</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
This table reports results of panel regressions of the firm-level investment rate on discount rates. We consider net investment measured as $I_t = (\text{CAPEX}_{t+1} - \text{Depreciation}_{t+1})/\text{PPEN}_t$. Right hand side variables are all measured at time $t$, as detailed in the text. Tobin’s Q is measured as the book-to-market value of debt and equity. Standard errors are double-clustered by firm and date. The left- and right-hand side variables are measured in percentage points. Sample is 2002 to 2021 and excludes firms in the financial sector. Fin. cost of capital is the financial cost of capital estimated using the WACC and the CAPM.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>(1)</th>
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<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discount rate</td>
<td>-0.90***</td>
<td>-0.84***</td>
<td>-0.90***</td>
<td>-0.86***</td>
<td>-0.82**</td>
<td>-0.75**</td>
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<td>(0.29)</td>
<td>(0.27)</td>
<td>(0.36)</td>
<td>(0.35)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Financial WACC (firm-level)</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>(0.98)</td>
<td>(1.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.75)</td>
<td>(0.91)</td>
<td>(1.16)</td>
<td>(1.16)</td>
<td>(1.16)</td>
<td>(1.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobin’s Q</td>
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<td>1.01*</td>
<td>1.13**</td>
<td>1.01*</td>
<td>(0.44)</td>
<td>(0.51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.44)</td>
<td>(0.51)</td>
<td>(0.44)</td>
<td>(0.51)</td>
<td>(0.44)</td>
<td>(0.51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
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<td>1,004</td>
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<td>957</td>
<td>794</td>
<td>794</td>
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<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
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<td>0.810</td>
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<td>Firm</td>
<td>Firm</td>
<td>Firm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cluster</td>
<td>Firm/year</td>
<td>Firm/year</td>
<td>Firm/year</td>
<td>Firm/year</td>
<td>Firm/year</td>
<td>Firm/year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within $R^2$</td>
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<td>0.034</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>0.062</td>
<td>0.050</td>
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</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$
Table 5
Differences in Discount Rates and Wedges Across Firms

This table reports results of panel regressions of the firm-level discount rates and discount rate wedges on three different metrics that may explain discount rate wedges. The first is market power, measured using the accounting method in Baqaee and Farhi (2020). The second is volatility, measured using the firms’ implied volatility. The third is financial constraints, measured using the index by Hadlock and Pierce (2010). The right-hand side variables are average values between 2000 and 2002. Sample is 2002 to 2021. All right-hand side variables are standardized.

<table>
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<th>(3)</th>
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<td>1.18*</td>
<td>1.23*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.60)</td>
<td>(0.60)</td>
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<td>Risk (2002)</td>
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<td>(0.50)</td>
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<td>Fin. Constraints (2002)</td>
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<td>(0.57)</td>
<td>(0.55)</td>
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<td>799</td>
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<td>Country/year</td>
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<td>Cluster</td>
<td>Firm/year</td>
<td>Firm/year</td>
<td>Firm/year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within $R^2$</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.095</td>
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</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 6
The Role of Market Power in the Evolution of Discount Rates and Wedges

This table reports results of panel regressions of the firm-level discount rates and discount rate wedges on market power in 2002 interacted with three different variables: calendar year, perceived cost of capital at the country level, and the (predicted) the perceived cost of capital at the firm level. Market power standardized and measured using the accounting method in Baqaee and Farhi (2020). Sample is 2002 to 2021. The table only shows the slope coefficients for the interaction terms. The discount rate wedge $\kappa_i$ is measured as the discount rate minus the (predicted) perceived cost of capital. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year.

<table>
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<th>(6)</th>
<th>(7)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Discount rate ($\delta$)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Market Power (2002)*Year</td>
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<td>0.13**</td>
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<td>(0.055)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Discount rate wedge ($\kappa$)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market Power (2002)*Country perc. WACC</td>
<td>-0.43**</td>
<td>-0.38**</td>
<td>-0.40**</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Market Power (2002)*Predicted perc. WACC</td>
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<td>0.960</td>
<td>0.963</td>
<td>0.959</td>
<td>0.958</td>
<td>0.961</td>
<td>0.943</td>
<td>0.941</td>
<td>0.951</td>
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<td>Firm</td>
<td>Firm</td>
<td>Firm</td>
<td>Firm</td>
<td>Firm</td>
<td>Firm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within $R^2$</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.041</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 7
The Role of Risk in the Evolution of Discount Rates and Wedges

This table reports results of panel regressions of the firm-level discount rates and discount rate wedges on firm-level implied volatility interacted with the irreversibility of assets in 2002. We measure irreversibility as the negative of asset deployability from Kim and Kung (2017). Sample is 2002 to 2021. All right-hand side variables are standardized.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discount rate</td>
<td>κ</td>
<td>κ</td>
<td>κ + υ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>-0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.88)</td>
<td>(1.86)</td>
<td>(1.59)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk*Irreversibility</td>
<td>3.99</td>
<td>8.29*</td>
<td>12.1**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3.79)</td>
<td>(4.09)</td>
<td>(4.86)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations 581 581 581
R-squared 0.957 0.953 0.941
FE Firm Firm Firm
Cluster Firm/year Firm/year Firm/year
Within $R^2$ 0.0013 0.025 0.055

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Figure 1
Histograms of the Perceived Cost of Capital and Discount Rates

This figure plots histograms for the perceived cost of capital and discount rates.
Figure 2
The Time Series of Corporate Discount Rates

This figure plots the average discount rate, perceived cost of capital, and perceived cost of debt for different years in the US.
This figure plots the perceived cost of equity along with three different estimates of expected stock returns. We estimate the average average perceived cost of equity in each year in a firm-year panel that includes firm fixed effects. The figure plots three-year moving averages. We include two measures based on the earnings yield, one which assumes a real growth of 2 percent and one which assumes a real growth of 4 percent. The “standard MBA class” measure is calculated as the risk-free rate plus the long-run market risk premium of 6 percent, as in the example by Cochrane (2011). Panel A plots expected stock returns/cost of equity and Panel B plots expected stock returns/cost of equity measured in excess of the risk-free interest rate.
Figure 4
Discount Rates and Cost of Capital in Different Countries

This figure plots the average discount rates and perceived cost of capital in the different countries in our sample. Data are from 2002 to 2021.
Figure 5
The Discount Rate Wedge in the US

This figure plots the average discount rate wedge (difference between discount rate and perceived cost of capital) in the sample of US firms. We isolate variation over time by controlling for time-invariant differences across firms. Specifically, we regress firm discount rates on year and firm fixed effects and measure the average “within-firm” discount rate in every year by adding the year fixed effect to the unconditional mean. We follow an analogous procedure to create the average “within-firm” perceived cost of capital in every year. The difference between the two series is the “within-firm” discount rate wedge $\kappa$. 
Figure 6
Discount Rates and Investment in the US

This figure plots the time series of average discount rates and aggregate net investment in the US. Investment is one year ahead relative to discount rates. We measure net investment using BEA data.
The “Adjusted Q”

This figure plots Tobin’s Q as well as “Adjusted Q”. Tobin’s Q is calculated using flow of funds data as in Crouzet and Eberly (2022). Adjusted Q is calculated by adjusting Tobin’s Q for the wedge between discount rates and the cost of capital, as explained in the text. The sample is the United States.
Figure 8
Adjusted Q and Missing Investment

This figure plots the cumulative investment shortfall in percent relative to the capital stock, calculated using Tobin’s Q as well as adjusted Q. Tobin’s Q is calculated using flow of funds data as in Crouzet and Eberly (2022). Adjusted Q is calculated by correcting Tobin’s Q for the wedge between discount rates and the cost of capital, as explained in the text. We estimate the relation between investment and Q using the 1990-2002 sample and calculate cumulative residuals with respect to these out of sample. The pre-2002 adjusted Q is based on backwards extrapolated discount rate wedges (see text for details). The investment is aggregate investment, including intangibles, from BEA. The sample is the United States.
Figure 9
Market Power and Discount Rates

This figure plots the discount rates for high- and low-markup firms over time. We group firms into high- and low-markup firms based on the average markup of the firm in the 2000-2002 period. For each group we estimate the average annual discount rate in panel regression that include firm fixed effects. We smooth the resulting time series for discount rates over three years and normalize both series to start at 0 in 2003. Markups are measured using as accounting profits using the method in Baqee and Farhi (2020).
Online Appendix to
“Corporate Discount Rates”

Appendix A  Tables and Figures

Table A1
Investment and Corporate Discount Rates: Robustness 1 (Asset Expansion)

This table reports results of panel regressions of the firm-level investment rate on discount rates. We consider asset expansion measured as $I_t = \frac{\text{Assets}_{t+1}}{\text{Assets}_t}$. Right hand side variables are all measured at time $t$, as detailed in the text. Tobin’s Q is measured as the book-to-market value of debt and equity. Standard errors are double-clustered by firm and date. The left- and right-hand side variables are measured in percentage points. Sample is 2002 to 2021 and excludes firms in the financial sector. Fin. cost of capital is the financial cost of capital estimated using the WACC and the CAPM.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>(1)</th>
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<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discount rate</td>
<td>-0.59*</td>
<td>-0.60**</td>
<td>-0.74***</td>
<td>-0.74**</td>
<td>-0.96**</td>
<td>-0.82**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial WACC (firm-level)</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>1.42*</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobin’s Q</td>
<td>3.07***</td>
<td>3.51***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
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<td>1,009</td>
<td>1,009</td>
<td>809</td>
<td>809</td>
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<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.432</td>
<td>0.476</td>
<td>0.446</td>
<td>0.492</td>
<td>0.552</td>
<td>0.600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FE</td>
<td>Firm</td>
<td>Firm/year</td>
<td>Firm</td>
<td>Firm/year</td>
<td>Firm</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cluster</td>
<td>Firm/year</td>
<td>Firm/year</td>
<td>Firm/year</td>
<td>Firm/year</td>
<td>Firm/year</td>
<td>Firm/year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within $R^2$</td>
<td>0.0040</td>
<td>0.0042</td>
<td>0.0080</td>
<td>0.0095</td>
<td>0.081</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
### Table A2

**Investment and Corporate Discount Rates: Robustness 2 (Intangibles)**

This table reports results of panel regressions of the firm-level investment rate on discount rates. We consider net investment including intangibles measured by R&D expenditure and capitalization of SGA. Right hand side variables are all measured at time $t$, as detailed in the text. Tobin’s Q is measured as the book-to-market value of debt and equity. Standard errors are double-clustered by firm and date. The left- and right-hand side variables are measured in percentage points. Sample is 2002 to 2021 and excludes firms in the financial sector. Fin. cost of capital is the financial cost of capital estimated using the WACC and the CAPM.

<table>
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<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discount rate</td>
<td>-0.27</td>
<td>-0.30**</td>
<td>-0.29</td>
<td>-0.32***</td>
<td>-0.50**</td>
<td>-0.45***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Financial WACC (firm-level)</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>-0.26*</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.16</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
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<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tobin’s Q</td>
<td>0.42***</td>
<td>0.47***</td>
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<td>(0.15)</td>
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<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.874</td>
<td>0.889</td>
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<td>FE Cluster</td>
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<td>Firm</td>
<td>Firm/year</td>
<td>Firm</td>
<td>Firm/year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within $R^2$</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>0.050</td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>0.10</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

A2
**Table A3**

**Missing Investment**

This table reports results of time-series regressions of net investment on Tobin’s Q, the Adjusted Q, and variables capturing trends. We consider calendar year and a post-2002 dummy as right-hand side trend variables. Net investment is calculated from the BEA tables. The sample is 1990 to 2021. Adjusted Q in the pre-2002 sample is calculated based on a backward-extrapolated discount rate wedge as explained in the text. Standard errors are calculated using Newey-West adjusted for 5 lags. Regressions are annual.

<table>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Netinvestment</td>
<td>Netinvestment</td>
<td>Netinvestment</td>
<td>Netinvestment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobin’s Q</td>
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<td>1.33***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted Q</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.95***</td>
<td>4.72***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.64)</td>
<td>(0.75)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>-0.09***</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-2002 dummy</td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.28***</td>
<td>-0.31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.26)</td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Figure A1
Within-Firm Variation in Discount Rates and Cost of Capital

This figure plots the within-firm standard deviation of the perceived cost of capital (left) and discount rates (right). The sample is 2002 to 2021. We consider within-firm variation of all firms with more than 4 quarterly observations. The figure excludes firms for which discount rates and cost of capital are always constant.
Figure A2
Tobin’s Q, Adjusted Q, and Net Investment

This figure plots Tobin’s Q and the Adjusted Q along with the Net Investment Rate. Net investment is calculated from the BEA tables. The sample is 1990 to 2021. Adjusted Q in the pre-2002 sample is calculated based on a backward-extrapolated discount rate wedge as explained in the text.
Figure A3
Investment sensitivities With and Without Discount Rate Wedges

This figure plots the sensitivity of the net investment rate with respect to the financial cost of capital. The leftmost bar shows the sensitivity in a standard model where the cost of capital and discount rate wedges are zero. The middle bar shows the sensitivity when incorporating only the impact of the ratio of discount rate to financial cost of capital. The right bar shows the sensitivity when also incorporating the duration effect.
Appendix B  Details on Measurement

Appendix B.1  Extraction of Paragraphs from Conference Calls

The Thomson One database contains transcripts of conference calls held since January 2002. We download all calls in English that were available on September 9, 2021. Using an automatic text search algorithm, we identify relevant paragraphs in all the calls that fulfill two criteria: first, they contain one of the terms “percent,” “percentage,” or “%” and second, they contain at least one keyword related to cost of capital, discount rates, and investment. The keywords are capital asset pricing model, cost of capital, cost of debt, cost of equity, discount rate, expect a return, expected rate of return, expected return, fudge factor, hurdle rate, internal rate of return, opportunity cost of capital, require a return, required rate of return, required return, return on assets, return on invested capital, return on net assets, weighted average cost of capital, weighted cost of capital. We also include abbreviations of the keywords in the search, for example, IRR. We identify roughly 74,000 of such paragraphs.

We match the firm name listed on Thomson One to Compustat by using a fuzzy merge algorithm, checking each match by hand. Ultimately, we link 88 percent of paragraphs to a Compustat firm. We combine the relevant paragraphs into data entry sheets of 500 paragraph each. To facilitate manual data entry, we include the date of the call, firm name, and blank columns for all financial figures of interest in the sheet. These figures are:

- discount rate
- hurdle rate
- hurdle premium over the cost of capital
- fudge factor over the cost of capital
- cost of debt
- weighted average cost of capital (WACC)
- opportunity cost of capital (OCC)
- cost of capital
- cost of equity
- required, expected, and realized internal rate of return (IRR)
- required, expected, and realized return on invested capital (ROIC)
- required, expected, and realized return on equity (ROE)
- required, expected, and realized return on assets (ROA)
- required, expected, and realized return on net assets
Appendix B.2  Data Entry Team

We read through each paragraph and enter the figures into the sheets. A total of 15 outstanding undergraduate research assistants contributed over the past two years. The average team size at any point in time was 5. Our research team met on a weekly basis to discuss individual cases and notes taken by the assistants and to coordinate on consistent guidelines.

We train each assistant. They learn about the basics of NPV methods and firm investment and read roughly 2,000 randomly selected paragraphs for training, which we then check and discuss manually. About two-thirds of the paragraphs were read twice, by different assistants, to minimize errors. The authors checked all outlier observations in the distribution of discount rates and changes in discount rates.

Appendix B.3  Guidelines for Manual Data Entry

We establish clear rules for which figures should be recorded. For the main analysis of this paper, we are interested in various ways that managers express discount rates (as hurdle rate, premium or fudge factor over the cost of capital, or required IRR) and their internally calculated, perceived cost of capital (as OCC or WACC). However, we include the larger set of terms listed above among the keywords and in the data entry sheets to ensure that our team differentiates required from expected and realized IRR as well as from various types of other returns. (The difference between how managers use the terms IRR and ROIC in practice is noteworthy. IRR usually refers to the marginal return on an individual project, while ROIC refers to operating profits relative to the entire value of capital on the firm’s balance sheet.)

We do not record hypothetical numbers (e.g., ”we may use a discount rate of x percent” or ”for illustrative purposes, imagine that we use a cost of capital of x”) and figures given by someone outside the firm (e.g., an analyst on the call suggesting a specific cost of capital for the firm). The context of statements is often key, so automated text processing cannot easily replace human reading for this task. For instance, the abbreviation OCC may refer to the opportunity cost of capital but more often than not actually refers to Old Corrugated Cardboard, a term for used cardboard boxes used in the transport and recycling industries.

We only measure discount rates when managers explicitly discuss them as part of an investment rule. This means, for example, that we do not record discount rates used to value firms’ pension liabilities. We focus on discount rates and the cost of capital that represent general investment rules of the firm, as opposed to specific figures related to individual projects. For instance, we do not record the cost of capital for a particular bond issuance. The paragraphs in the data entry sheets are sorted by firm and date, which helps us to interpret statements from the same firm consistently. When managers list multiple discount
rates (usually for different regions and industries), we enter the figures that are representative for most of the company’s operations (e.g., US figures for a US company). We discuss all cases with multiple rates among the whole team.

Managers mostly discuss their unlevered, after-tax discount rate and cost of capital. We note when managers refer to levered and pre-tax discount rates (1.7 and 0.7 percent of discount rate observations, respectively) and to levered and pre-tax cost of capital (0 and 1.9 percent of cost of capital observations, respectively). We convert all observations into unlevered, after-tax values by estimating the average percentage point difference between levered and unlevered as well as after- and pre-tax observations, controlling for country-by-year fixed effects, and adjusting the values for the average difference.

Managers sometimes specify a range rather than an actual value. We enter the average value in these cases. We do not record values when the range is very large or ambiguous. Managers sometimes give different realized returns depending on the time horizon (e.g., ”we have achieved a 5 percent ROIC over the last 5 years and a 10 percent ROIC over the last 10.”) We enter the most recent horizon for such cases. Realized returns referring to a previous episode unconnected to current years (e.g., ”return in the 1990s”) are not recorded.

**Appendix C  Adjusted Q and the Effect of Discount Rates on Investment**

We use the model of adjusted Q in Section 4.2.1 to derive the relation between investment and discount rates, given that there are wedges. We analyze how a change in the discount rate, which is exogenous to the cash flow of investment projects and adjustment costs, affects investment:

**Proposition 2 (Investment and Discount Rates).** At the steady state, we observe the following relation between investment and an exogenous shock to the discount rate:

\[
\frac{\Delta \left( \frac{\mu}{k} - \delta \right)}{\Delta (r^{\text{fin.}} + u + \kappa)} \sim -\frac{1}{\phi} \times \frac{\text{Dur}}{(u + \kappa) \times \text{Dur} + 1}.
\] (A1)

Proposition 2 follows from inserting Proposition 1 into equation 11 and taking the derivative with respect to the discount rate. It says that an increase in the discount rate decreases the value of future profits, the marginal value of capital, and thereby the incentive to invest. Two channels determine the strength of the effect. First, the duration of cash flows plays a role. If wedges are zero \((u + \kappa = 0)\), the denominator of the right-hand side of Proposition
2 is equal to 1 and the effect solely depends on the duration relative to adjustment costs. Intuitively, investment is more responsive to discount rates if the duration is longer. The second channel plays a role if wedges are non-zero. With positive wedges, the duration is effectively shortened, which decreases the sensitivity of investment to discount rates.

To compare the model to the estimates, we assume a cash flow duration of 30 years, as is approximately the case for an unlevered firm (Gormsen and Lazarus 2022, van Binsbergen 2020), and that φ = 10.\textsuperscript{A1} The observed average discount rate wedge of 8 percentage points implies that the effect of discount rates on net investment is:

\[
\frac{\Delta \left( \frac{v}{k_t} - \delta \right)}{\Delta (r^{\text{fin.}} + v + \kappa)} \sim \frac{-1}{10} \times \frac{30}{0.08 \times 30 + 1} \sim -0.88,
\]

which is in line with our empirical estimates that lie between -0.8 and -0.9.

### Appendix D  Details on Theory

#### Appendix D.1  Proof of Proposition 1

We know from (12) that

\[
q_t = \frac{\delta V_t(v + \kappa, k_t)}{\delta k_{t+1}} = \frac{V_t(v + \kappa, k_t)}{k_{t+1}} = Q_t.
\]

To estimate Q, we must calculate \(V_t(v + \kappa, k_t)\). Note that \(V_t(v + \kappa, k_t)\) is the value of the future profits produced by capital, calculated using \(r^{\text{fin.}} + v + \kappa\) as the discount rate. If we set \(v = \kappa = 0\), we get the value of these profits calculated using the cost of capital as the discount rates, \(V_t(0, k_t)\), which is the value of the firms in the financial markets. We can approximate both using the Gordon growth model

\[
V_t(0, k_t) \sim \frac{CF_{t+1}}{r - g}
\]

\[
V_t(v + \kappa, k_t) \sim \frac{CF_{t+1}}{r^{\text{fin.}} + v + \kappa - g}
\]

where \(g\) is the long-run growth rate of free cash flows and \(CF_{t+1}\) is the free cash flow next period. Both of these variables are unobserved.

\textsuperscript{A1}The assumption \(\phi = 10\) is based on Philippon (2009), who discusses various estimates used in the literature.
We can calculate the value of $V_t(v + \kappa, k_t)$ as

$$V_t(v + \kappa, k_t) = V_t(0, k_t) \frac{r - g}{r_{\text{fin.}} + v + \kappa - g} = V_t(0, k_t) \frac{1}{x \times \text{Dur} + 1}$$

(A2)

where Dur is the weighted average of the firm's future cash flows, which in the Gordon growth model is given by:

$$\text{Dur} = \frac{1}{r - g}$$

(Gormsen and Lazarus 2022).

We can then calculate $Q$ by inserting (A2) into (12) and using that

$$Q^{\text{Tobin}} = \frac{V_t(0, k_t)}{k_{t+1}}.$$

**Alternative Formulation Without Duration**

We can replace Dur in 13 with Tobin’s $Q$ and return on equity. Under the assumption that the firm is fully equity financed,

$$\frac{1}{\text{Dur}} = r - g = \frac{E}{P} = \frac{B}{M} \text{ROE} = \frac{\text{ROE}}{Q^{\text{Tobin}}}$$

such that

$$Q_t = Q^{\text{Tobin}} \frac{V_t(v + \kappa, k_t)}{V_t(0, k_t)} = Q^{\text{Tobin}} \frac{\text{ROE}}{x \times Q^{\text{Tobin}} + \text{ROE}}.$$ 

(A3)

**Appendix E   Examples of Conference Calls Signaling Prudence**

2013-05-23, Kinder Morgan, Kim Dang, CFO: “We do not do projects close to our cost of capital. (...) Our cost of capital is 9 percent, we are not going to go out and do a project in 9.5 percent or 10 percent because there are just too many potential for changes in what you expect to happen. (...) We’re not going to take the risk that we have a project come in at or below our cost of capital.”

2009-07-30, Lincoln National Corporation, Fred Crawford, CFO: “As a matter of being conservative in our approach, we’ve been hiking up those discount rates quite considerably on our businesses (...). Example being variable business is up into the mid teens with life businesses in and around the 10 percent range, even 11 percent range, depending on the business. But
2009-01-14, Ryland Group, Inc., Larry Nicholson, President & COO: “Our hurdle rates have always been 30 percent as long as I’ve been with the Company – that’s 14 years – and Chad, as long as he’s been with the Company, has maintained that. I think that’s served us well, kept us from doing some things maybe that would have hurt us in the downturn. I think it kept us out of a lot of trouble. So I think the strategy’s been good. I think it’s been prudent.”